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The Latin adagio unus testis nullus testis is an important
principle that equally applies to criminal law as to science:
we should not base our conclusions on a single piece of
evidence [1]. Of course, criminal law and science are very
different practices. After all, while a criminal case typi-
cally revolves around the evaluation of evidence in favour
of and against competing hypotheses about what occurred
in a particular case with specific actors, the goal of science
is to establish generally applicable laws and principles. Yet,
what unites the two practices is that both are about estab-
lishing a chain of evidence: pieces of evidence have to be
anchored as narratives into a story line that increases the
plausibility of some hypothesis relative to competing hy-
potheses. Just like a DNA match from a cigarette found at
a crime scene cannot be sufficient to conclude on the guilt
of the suspect in the absence of contextual information on
how the cigarette got there (e. g. eyewitness testimonies),
the meaning of findings from a scientific study cannot be
established without considering context, theory and rele-
vant previous research. In other words, science too is about
storytelling [2].
In their article Science: The slow march of accumulating
evidence [3], Picho, Maggio and Artino discuss a very pow-
erful if not the most powerful tool for establishing chains
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of evidence and solid stories in a scientific research field:
replication. We fully support the authors’ plea to treat repli-
cation as essential to the accumulation of knowledge in the
field of medical education and would like to take it even
one step further by arguing that the potential of replication
is even bigger than discussed in the vast body of literature
on replication in education and psychology thus far.
Why the potential of replication is even bigger than
discussed thus far
Picho and colleagues distinguish between direct and con-
ceptual replication. While the former comes down to re-
peating a study as closely as possible, the latter is about
attempts to test the theory that underlies particular findings.
The authors provide excellent arguments for why especially
conceptual replication can help improve the quality of re-
search in a field. Take for instance the so-called expertise
reversal effect [4]: instructional support that is beneficial
for novice learners loses its effectiveness or even becomes
detrimental as learners become more proficient. This ef-
fect has been replicated for different types of learners in
different domains and therefore has clear implications for
educational practice and research in these domains.
However, we would like to argue that both direct and
conceptual replication have a use for at least one common
reason: different studies are carried out with different par-
ticipants and therefore always yield somewhat different re-
sults. In sampling theory, this is also referred to as sampling
error. Under the assumption of random sampling, which
underlies the frequently reported p-values and many other
statistics, findings from individual studies and hence dif-
ferences between studies are to some extent always due
to chance. This sample-to-sample fluctuation is especially
Science without replication 321
large when dealing with small samples, something that is
quite common in medical education research (e. g. only ten
residents or twenty students). In small samples, estimates
of parameters of interest (e. g. means, correlations and re-
gression coefficients) can vary considerably from sample to
sample [5] and both false positive and false negative rates
tend to be elevated [6]. Both direct and conceptual replica-
tion can in such a context help obtain more stable estimates
(statistics) and reduce both types of erroneous hypothesis
testing decisions [7].
Although replication, and direct replication in particular
[3], is commonly associated with repeating experimental
procedures, it is also very useful in the context of instrument
development. The latter is often forgotten and that is unfor-
tunate because the stability of factors in a questionnaire, test
or assessment tool is established in a series of studies rather
than in a single study. That is, if we have a questionnaire
of say ten items that are expected to form three factors, the
same sets of items should pop up in psychometric analysis
in different samples [8]. If we fail to replicate this factor
structure in subsequent samples, we cannot assume stable
factors let alone that our factors consistently measure the
constructs we are interested in. Moreover, the use of psy-
chometric instruments introduces a source of error next to
sampling error, namely measurement error: fluctuation of
scores across administrations of a given instrument due to
imperfect reliability of that instrument. This type of error
adds to sample-to-sample variation and hence even more
underlines the need for replication studies.
Where replications can help researchers obtain more sta-
ble statistics and reduce false positive and false negative
rates when dealing with quantitative data, in the context of
qualitative data replication studies can help for instance to
assess whether indeed saturation was reached in an initial
study. After all, if researchers in a qualitative study de-
cide at some point that further data collection is not needed
because saturation has been achieved, a replication of the
study with a very similar group of participants should yield
very similar results.
What steps must be taken to enable and facilitate
replication
From the previous, it becomes clear that whether we are
dealing with quantitative, qualitative or mixed-methods
data, it is of paramount importance that all choices and
decisions made throughout the study – prior to and after
data collection – be made explicit [9–11]. Although this
is of course typically much more difficult for qualitative
than for quantitative data, the findings from the Repro-
ducibility Project [12] make very clear that establishing
generally applicable laws and principles cannot reasonably
be achieved without replication. Whether we are interested
in measuring learning outcomes from training of medical
specialists or in experiences of anxiety in a particular pa-
tient population, the stakes are high and thus studies need
to be replicated to maintain and improve the quality of
our research [9–11] and the implications for practice and
further study that come forth from that research.
Finally, with regard to quantitative data, we need to study
the test-retest reliability of our questionnaires, tests and
other psychometric instruments more than we have done
thus far [13]. Cronbach’s alpha and other statistics used
as indicators of the reliability of measurements at a sin-
gle point in time tell us close to nothing about the extent
to which the repeated use of our instruments would result
in similar outcomes. The extent to which repeated use of
our instruments results in similar outcomes is indicated by
a good test-retest reliability and is a necessary condition
for meaningful replication research, even if these replica-
tion studies do not include the same group of participants.
An instrument supposed to measure medical students’ mo-
tivation to learn about medicine resulting in totally unre-
lated scores for the same students in two consecutive weeks
would not have a good test-retest reliability and should thus
not be used in studies that intend to measure this construct.
To conclude
If the goal of science is to establish generally applicable
laws and principles, replication is a conditio sine qua non:
without replication, we cannot establish whether findings
obtained in a given study are artefacts or actually reflect
laws and principles that have a certain applicability out-
side the given study. The plea by Picho and colleagues
to put replication more at the forefront is a very welcome
and timely contribution to the discussion on an issue of
fundamental importance to the field of medical education.
We fully support their arguments in favour of replication,
applaud efforts by journals such as this one to give more op-
portunities to researchers for replication research, and hope
that more researchers will use this space. With regard to
the latter, making all choices and decisions made through-
out the study explicit and an increased focus on test-retest
reliability of instruments used will provide the necessary
guidance.
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